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Abstract
Malware detection and analysis is a major part of computer security. There is an arm
race between security experts and malware developers to develop various techniques to secure
computer systems and to ﬁnd ways to circumvent these security methods. In recent years
process heap-based attacks have increased signiﬁcantly. These attacks exploit the system
under attack via the heap, typically by using a heap spraying attack. The main drawback
with existing techniques is that they either consume too many resources or are complicated
to implement. Our work in this thesis focuses on new methods which ooads process heap
analysis for guest Virtual Machines (VM) to the privileged domain using Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) in a Cloud environment. VMI provides us with a seamless, non-intrusive
and invisible (to malwares) way of observing the memory and state of VMs without raising
red ﬂags for the malwares.
Key Words: Introspection, Cloud Computing, Malware Analysis, Virtual Machines,
XEN, LibVMI, Kernel.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we will discuss the motivations behind this research. The primary incentive
behind this research was to ameliorate the spread of heap spray which has reached to an
epidemic proportion. Heap sprays are mostly used to evade various security mechanisms
being deployed out there, especially at operating system (OS) and hardware level. Most
exploits use some sort of venerability in the application or the OS to revert or overwrite
some pointers. Controlling these overwritten pointers is much diﬃcult now, as many se-
curity mechanism like DEP and ASLR are being deployed. Heap spray is being used by
malware developer as a landing platform for various vulnerabilities especially in commonly
used applications like Web Browsers and PDF viewers to bypass these security measures and
increasing the probability of the malwares to work.
In the Section 1.1, we are going to discuss how heap sprays have become an important
tool in a malware developer. In Section 1.3, we are going to describe various development
libraries and platforms that we have used in our research to develop various tools that detect
and analyze heap-based malwares and various other type of kernel level malwares and ﬁnally
in Section 1.4, we list the various contributions we have made in this thesis.
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1.1 Heap Spraying
The goal of any attack is to get the targeted computer to run exploit code supplied by the
attacker. To achieve this, two things must happen:
1. The code must end up on the computer.
2. The computer must run that code.
Attackers achieve these goals by using various method and techniques. The earliest type
of memory exploit took advantage of buﬀer-stack overﬂows. Attackers found ways to over-
write a buﬀer on the stack and used that vulnerability to change or insert program code
to make the program jump to instructions provided by the attacker. Stack-overﬂow attacks
diminished in eﬀectiveness as programming languages evolved to prevent buﬀer overﬂows.
Memory exploits then focused on heap-based overﬂows, in which, instead of placing instruc-
tions on the stack, attackers found ways to insert them into the program's heap. Nowadays,
heap-based exploits are more diﬃcult to achieve. Operating systems such as Windows Vista
and on-wards use a technique called Address-based Layout Randomization(ASLR) [65] in
which the base address of the code, the heap, and the stack change each time the program
runs. This prevents attackers from reliably predicting target addresses for code locations,
and if there is one copy of the exploit code in a large heap, it's akin to ﬁnding the proverbial
needle in a haystack.
1.1.1 Heap Spray Techniques
Heap spraying circumvents these challenges by allocating, or "spraying," multiple copies of
exploit code to increase the odds of ﬁnding a copy in the heap. The attacker can allocate
hundreds of thousands of copies of exploit code into the heap. All that's needed is for one
random program jump to land on one copy of such code, and a successful attack begins.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a common method of implementing a heap-spraying attack using
JavaScript. Heap spraying requires a memory corruption exploit, as in this example, where
2
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Figure 1.1: Typical Heap Spray
1 <SCRIPT language=" text / j a v a s c r i p t ">
2
3 sh e l l c o d e = unescape ( "%u4343%u4343% . . . " ) ;
4
5 oneblock = unescape ( "%u0D0D%u0D0D" ) ;
6
7 var f u l l b l o c k = oneblock ;
8
9 while ( f u l l b l o c k . l ength < 0x40000 ) {
10 f u l l b l o c k += f u l l b l o c k ;
11 }
12
13 prayContainer = new Array ( ) ;
14
15 for ( i =0; i <1000; i++) {
16 sprayContainer [ i ] = f u l l b l o c k + sh e l l c o d e ;
17 }
18
19 </SCRIPT>
Figure 1.2: Typical Heap Spray Code
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an attacker has corrupted a vtable method (M1) pointer to point to an incorrect address
of their choosing. At the same time, we assume that the attacker has been able, through
entirely legal methods, to allocate objects with contents of their choosing on the heap. Heap
spraying relies on then populating the heap with a large number of objects containing the
attacker's code, assigning the vtable exploit to jump to an arbitrary address in the heap, and
relying on luck that the jump will land inside one of their objects. To increase the likelihood
that the attack will succeed, attackers usually structure their objects to contain an initial
NOP sled (indicated in white) followed by the code that implements the exploit (commonly
referred to as shellcode, indicated with shading). Any jump that lands in the NOP sled will
eventually transfer control to the shellcode.
Increasing the size of the NOP sled and the number of sprayed objects increases the
probability that the attack will be successful. Heap spraying requires that the attacker
control the contents of the heap in the process they are attacking.There are numerous ways
to accomplish this goal, including providing data (such as a document or image) that when
read into memory creates objects with the desired properties. An easier approach is to take
advantage of scripting languages to allocate these objects directly. Browsers are particularly
vulnerable to heap spraying because JavaScript embedded in a web page authored by the
attacker greatly simpliﬁes such attacks. The example shown in Figure 1.2 shows a basic
script how to achieve this. While we are only showing the JavaScript portion of the page, this
payload would be typically embedded within an HTML page on the web. Once a victim visits
the page, the JavaScript payload is automatically executed. Line 3 allocates the shellcode
into a string, while lines 4 to 9 of the JavaScript code are responsible for setting up the
spraying NOP sled. Lines 13 to 15 create JavaScript objects each of which is the result of
combining the sled with the shellcode. It is quite typical for published exploits to contain a
long sled (256 KB in this case). Similarly, to increase the eﬀectiveness of the attack, a large
number of JavaScript objects are allocated on the heap, 1,000 in this case.
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1.1.2 Just In Time (JIT) Spraying
One of the newest and most popular exploitation techniques to bypass both ASLR and DEP
security protections is JIT memory spraying. There are two general reasons why JIT spraying
is a very useful exploitation method. Firstly, the code generated by the JIT compiler is stored
in memory marked as executable. This should be obvious because otherwise JIT compiler
would be unable to work correctly on systems shipped with the DEP feature. Evidently, if
the attacker's code is generated by JIT engine it will also reside in the executable area. In
other words, DEP is not involved in the protection of code emitted by the JIT compiler. This
is a very useful method since the memory was not marked as executable in prior approaches
like normal heap spraying. The second reason JIT spraying is powerful is that attacker's
code location can be predicted correctly [35] so at this point ASLR is also no longer a big
threat for the attacker.
Just-In-Time compilation converts code at runtime; typically from bytecode into ma-
chine code. By doing this, an interpreted program's performance greatly improves. The
JIT spraying method "forces" the JIT compiler to produce a lot of executable pages with
embedded attacker's code. In order to write the code to speciﬁc location, the JIT compiler
must ﬁrst mark the destination memory as writable. Since multiple generated code chunks
may reside on the same memory page, the JIT compiler marks the entire page as RWX
(ReadableWritable-Executable). These permissions are necessary because a diﬀerent chunk
of memory residing on the same page may be executed asynchronously (for example by a dif-
ferent thread), resulting in access violation if the requested memory page was not executable
at that moment. After the code is written the compiler marks the destination region as RX -
readable and executable not writable anymore. In order to force the JIT compiler to generate
code that includes shellcode data, attackers must make use of ActionScript operators.
Even though ActionScript consists of multiple operators like: arithmetic, arithmetic com-
pound assignment, bitwise etc. only one appears to be used in the currently known shell-
codes. When it comes to ActionScript operators, only XOR appears to produce desirable
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results. For example, with the XOR operator, the attacker controls four bytes of every single
instruction. In other cases the expression arguments do not provide precise and predictable
control over the emitted code blocks. By supplying diﬀerent arguments to the expression
it is possible to change the contents of speciﬁed blocks and make them more dependable
on attacker's arguments, but the XOR operator appears to be the best option for shellcode
usage and that is probably why every known JIT shellcode makes use of this operator. Once
the attacker is able to spray controlled executable instructions into the heap, the rest of the
exploitation process goes the standard route. The main idea here is to spray the memory
with instructions that include attacker's payload and then be able to transfer the execution
there (like for example be able to point the instruction pointer (EIP) to the address of xor
eax, IMM32 operand).
1.1.3 Heap Feng Shui
The exploitation of heap corruption vulnerabilities on the Windows platform has become
increasingly more diﬃcult since the introduction of XP SP2. Heap protection features such
as safe unlinking and heap cookies have been successful in stopping most generic heap ex-
ploitation techniques. Methods for bypassing the heap protection exist, but they require a
great degree of control over the allocation patterns of the vulnerable application.
Heap Feng Shui [68] introduces a new technique for precise manipulation of the browser
heap layout using speciﬁc sequences of JavaScript allocations. It uses JavaScript library
HeapLib with functions for setting up the heap in a controlled state before triggering a heap
corruption bug. This allows malware developers to exploit very diﬃcult heap corruption vul-
nerabilities with great reliability and precision.There are three main components of Internet
Explorer that allocate memory typically corrupted by browser heap vulnerabilities.
• The ﬁrst one is the MSHTML.DLL library, responsible for managing memory for
HTML elements on the currently displayed page. It allocates memory during the
initial rendering of the page, and during any subsequent DHTML manipulations. The
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memory is allocated from the default process heap and is freed when a page is closed
or HTML elements are destroyed.
• The second component that manages memory is the JavaScript engine in JSCRIPT.DLL.
Memory for new JavaScript objects is allocated from a dedicated JavaScript heap,
with the exception of strings, which are allocated from the default process heap.
Unreferenced objects are destroyed by the garbage collector, which runs when the
total memory consumption or the number of objects exceed a certain threshold. The
garbage collector can also be triggered explicitly by calling the CollectGarbage()
function.
• The ﬁnal component in most browser exploits is the ActiveX control that causes heap
corruption. Some ActiveX controls use a dedicated heap, but most allocate and corrupt
memory on the default process heap.
An important observation is that all three components of Internet Explorer use the
same default process heap. This means that allocating and freeing memory with JavaScript
changes the layout of the heap used by MSHTML and ActiveX controls, and a heap corrup-
tion bug in an ActiveX control can be used to overwrite memory allocated by the other two
browser components.
1.2 Operating System based Security
Techniques have been developed to counter against the heap spray attacks. Heap protection
features such as safe un-linking and heap cookies have been successful in stopping most
generic heap exploitation techniques. Methods for bypassing the heap protection exist [68],
but they require a great degree of control over the allocation patterns of the vulnerable
application. We are going to discuss some techniques against heap spray in the Chapter 2.
Two major security development that are becoming very popular recently are Address-based
Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [5].
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1.2.1 Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
Buﬀer overﬂow attacks, in which an attacker forces a program or component to store mali-
cious code in an area of memory not intended for it, are some of the most common exploits
seen today. DEP is a Windows feature that enables the system to mark one or more pages
of memory as non-executable. Marking memory regions as non-executable means that code
cannot be run from that region of memory, which makes it harder for exploits involving
buﬀer overruns to succeed.
DEP was introduced in Windows XP SP2 and has been included in all subsequent re-
leases of Windows desktop and server operating systems [18]. For application compatibility
reasons, DEP is "opt-in" in Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Windows 7. DEP protects
the operating system and core system ﬁles by default, but application developers or IT ad-
ministrators must speciﬁcally conﬁgure other programs to take advantage of DEP. DEP is
"opt-out" in Windows Server operating systems, meaning that DEP is enabled by default
for all programs unless speciﬁcally disabled for a program.
1.2.2 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
In older versions of Windows (Windows XP and below), core processes tended to be loaded
into predictable memory locations upon system start up. Some exploits work by targeting
memory locations known to be associated with particular processes. ASLR randomizes the
memory locations used by system ﬁles and other programs, making it much harder for an
attacker to correctly guess the location of a given process. The combination of ASLR and
DEP creates a fairly formidable barrier for attackers to overcome in order to achieve reliable
code execution when exploiting vulnerabilities.
ASLR was introduced in Windows Vista [65] and has been included in all subsequent
releases of Windows. As with DEP, ASLR is only enabled by default for core operating
system binaries and applications that are explicitly conﬁgured to use it via a new linker
switch.
8
Table 1.1: DEP and ASLR Deployment Status (May 2008) Source [59]
Application DEP (Win 7) DEP (Win XP) Full ASLR
Flash Player N/A N/A NO
Sun Java JRE NO NO NO
Adobe Reader YES NO NO
Mozilla Firefox NO NO NO
Apple Quicktime NO NO NO
VLC Media Player NO NO NO
Apple iTunes NO NO NO
Google Chrome N/A N/A N/A
Shockwave Player N/A N/A NO
OpenOﬃce.org NO NO NO
Google Picasa NO NO NO
Foxit Reader NO NO NO
Opera NO NO NO
Winamp NO NO NO
RealPlayer NO NO NO
Apple Safari NO NO NO
Table 1.2: DEP and ASLR Deployment Status (June 2010) Source [59]
Application DEP (Win 7) DEP (Win XP) Full ASLR
Flash Player N/A N/A YES
Sun Java JRE NO NO NO
Adobe Reader YES YES NO
Mozilla Firefox YES YES NO
Apple Quicktime NO NO NO
VLC Media Player NO NO NO
Apple iTunes YES NO NO
Google Chrome YES YES YES
Shockwave Player N/A N/A NO
OpenOﬃce.org NO NO NO
Google Picasa NO NO NO
Foxit Reader NO NO NO
Opera YES YES NO
Winamp NO NO NO
RealPlayer NO NO NO
Apple Safari YES YES NO
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1.2.3 Status of DEP and ASLR in Third Party Applications
The importance of DEP and ASLR can be judged by the fact that processor makers like
Intel [14] and AMD [3] have adopted their processors to support them directly [59]. Various
Operating Systems (OS) also adopted them slowly and now newest version of most of the
major OS's out there support them in one way or another [59]. Third party applications
were rather slow to adopt them. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show the pace of adaption of
DEP and ASLR from 2008 to 2010 [59]. It shows that most of the major applications out
there are still slow to adopt these security methods and still are vulnerable to the various
malwares that were hindered by the these security methods. This tell us that it is really
important for the security experts to develop various tools that look for malwares that
exploit the vulnerabilities of these third party application to keep them from being exploited
by malwares.
1.3 Virtual Machine Architecture
1.3.1 Virtual Machine Monitor
A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a thin layer of software that runs directly on the hard-
ware of a machine. The VMM exports a virtual machine abstraction (VM) that resembles
the underlying hardware. This abstraction models the hardware closely enough that soft-
ware which would run on the underlying hardware can also be run in a virtual machine.
VMMs virtualize all hardware resources, allowing multiple virtual machines to transparently
multiplex the resources of the physical machine. The operating system running inside of a
VM is traditionally referred to as the guest OS, and applications running on the guest OS
are similarly referred to as guest applications. Basic architecture of a VMM can be seen in
Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Architecture of two basic types of Virtual Machine Monitors
As Figure 1.3 shows, in a virtualized environment, a VMM provides the interface between
each VM and the underlying physical hardware. The OS layer between a VMM and the
physical hardware is optional, depending on which of the two major types of VM managers
you choose. In a Type 1 system the VMM runs directly on the physical hardware, eliminating
an abstraction layer and often improving eﬃciency as a result. Examples of Type 1 systems
include VMware ESX [29], XEN [31], and Microsoft Hyper-V [19]. In a type 2 system, the
VMM uses an OS as an interface to the physical hardware. Type 2 systems include VMware
Workstation [29], the QEMU [26] open source process emulator, KVM [15], Parallels [24],
and Virtual PC/Server [28]. Type 2 systems rely on the underlying OS to provide hardware
interaction and device drivers, and thus often have a wider range of physical hardware
components to interact with.
Traditionally, the VMM is the only privileged code running on the system. It is essentially
a small operating system. This style of VMM has been a standard part of mainframe
computers for 30 years, and recently has found its way onto commodity x86 PCs. Hosted
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VMMs like VMware have emerged that run a VMM concurrently with a commodity "host
OS" such as Windows or Linux. In this setting, the virtual machine appears as simply
another program running on the host operating system.
Despite a radical diﬀerence from the users perspective, traditional and hosted VMMs
diﬀer little in implementation. In a hosted architecture the VMM merely leverages a third-
party host OS to provide drivers, bootstrapping code, and other functionality common to
VMMs and traditional operating systems, instead of being forced to implement all of its
functionality from scratch. VMMs have traditionally been used for logical server partitioning,
and are supported for a wide range of architectures; for example, the IBM xSeries (x86
servers), pSeries (Unix), zSeries (mainframes), and iSeries (AS/400) all have VMMs available.
Recently, as hosted VMMs have appeared on the desktop, they have begun to discover other
applications such as cross-platform development and testing.
1.3.2 VMM Implementation
Although the speciﬁcs of a VMMs implementation are architecture-dependent, VMMs tend
to rely on similar implementation techniques. Among these techniques is conﬁguring the real
machine so that virtual machines can safely and directly execute using the machine's CPU
and memory. By doing this, VMMs can eﬃciently run software in the virtual machines at
speeds close to that achieved by running them on the bare hardware.
VMMs can also fully isolate the software running in a virtual machine from other virtual
machines, and from the virtual machine monitor. A common way to virtualize the CPU is to
run the VMM in the most privileged mode of the processor, while running virtual machines
in less privileged modes. All traps and interrupts that occur while a virtual machine is
running transfer control to the VMM. Attempts by the virtual machines to access privileged
operations trap into the VMM; the VMM emulates privileged operations for the VM. In this
architecture, the VMM can always control the virtual machine regardless of what the software
in the virtual machine does. Memory is commonly virtualized by keeping a virtual MMU
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for each virtual machine that reﬂects the VMs view of its address space. The VMM retains
control of the real MMU, and maps each VMs physical memory in such a way that VMs
do not share physical memory with each other, or with the VMM. Through this technique
the VMM is able to create the illusion that each VM has its own address space that it fully
controls. This also allows the VMM to isolate the VMs from one another and prevents them
from accessing the memory of the VMM. In addition to virtualizing the CPU and memory,
the VMM intercepts all input/output requests from VMs to virtual devices and maps them
to the correct physical I/O device. For memory-mapped I/O, the VMM only allows a virtual
machine to see and access the particular I/O devices it is permitted to use.
1.3.3 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is a technique for externally monitoring the run time
state of a system-level virtual machine. Monitors can be placed in another virtual machine,
within the hypervisor, or within any other part of the virtualization architecture. For virtual
machine introspection, the run time state can be deﬁned broadly to include processor regis-
ters, memory, disk, network, and any other hardware-level events. The introspection library
we have used through out this work is the LibVMI [17]. Section 1.3.4 discuss in details the
architecture and working of LibVMI library.
1.3.4 LibVMI
We have used libVMI [17] library extensively in our projects. It is an introspection library
focused on reading and writing memory from virtual machines (VMs). It is based on the
library Xenaccess [58] which was developed as a student project. Initially it only supported
Xen [31] but then, support for KVM was added to Xenaccess and Xenaccess was renamed
to libVMI. For convenience, LibVMI also provides functions for accessing CPU registers,
pausing and un-pausing a VM, printing binary data, and more. LibVMI is designed to work
across multiple virtualization platforms (LibVMI currently supports VMs running in either
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Xen or KVM). LibVMI also supports reading physical memory snapshots when saved as a
ﬁle (like VMware snapshots). It also support memory analysis tools like Volatility [30] to
directly access VMs memory but the performance is much slower that native libVMI based
programs.
LibVMI architecture is based on six high-level requirements. In a general sense, these
requirements can be seen as typical good programming guidelines, or good security guidelines.
This is done to leverage known design principles in order to build a robust monitoring
architecture. With this in mind following are the six requirements for monitoring VMs.
1. No superﬂuous modiﬁcations to the VMM: The VMM should remain as small
and simple as possible since it is part of the TCB. If a VMM includes the necessary
primitives to support the monitoring architecture, then it should not be modiﬁed. If a
VMM lacks the necessary primitives, then the modiﬁcations made should be what is
minimally required to support the monitoring architecture.
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2. No modiﬁcations to the VM or the target OS: Modiﬁcations to the target OS
(i.e., the OS being monitored) are problematic. The target OS can tamper with this
code, and changes to the target OS may require access to the target OS source code,
which is not always available. One of the key reasons why virtualization is attractive
for monitoring is the isolation between VMs. Placing monitoring code within the
same OS that is being monitored bypasses this isolation, negating this key beneﬁt.
Therefore, this requirement encourages all monitoring code to remain in an isolated
VM unless such a restriction makes it impossible for a monitor to gather the necessary
information.
3. Small performance impact: An excessive performance impact can render a monitor-
ing architecture worthless. This requirement ensures that the monitoring architecture
does not prevent the target OS from performing its intended functions. The perfor-
mance impact is measured as any reduction in performance of an application caused
by the monitoring software. Ideally this impact is both small and consistent, but some
initialization costs may be required.
4. Rapid development of new monitors: New monitors may be needed to address
new types of attacks. Furthermore, it is advantageous to keep the monitor code simple
to limit the opportunity for introducing errors into the monitors. The monitoring
architecture should provide APIs that are used to develop new monitors. Therefore,
satisfaction of this requirement means that the APIs should be designed in a way that
simpliﬁes the job of the monitor developer.
5. Ability to monitor any data on target OS: Monitors should have a full view
into the target OS. The monitoring architecture should not be limited to providing
information about a small part of the target OS. For example, an ideal memory monitor
should be able to view all memory on the target OS. Likewise, an ideal disk monitor
should be able to view all data going to and from the disk device. While this ideal
15
may not always be possible, the more information a monitor can view, the harder it is
for an attacker to evade detection.
6. Target OS cannot tamper with monitors: If the target OS can tamper with the
monitors, then the possibility exists for malicious code to tamper with the monitors.
For this reason, all of the monitors should be isolated or protected from the target OS.
This is related to requirement (2), above. However, here it is required that all monitor
code, regardless of its location, be protected from attack. If all monitor code is in an
isolated VM, then this is not diﬃcult. If some monitor code must be placed outside of
the TCB, then additional measures must be taken to protect that code. The extent of
these measures will depend on the nature of the code being protected.
This implementation methodology provides an excellent platform for us to develop various
malware analysis and detection tools. Although it doesn't fully provide all the aspects
required for our research but served as an excellent starting point for us for development of
various tools.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis research has been taken from the collaboration which contributed to the ﬁelds
of malware analysis, computer forensics, Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) and Cloud
Computing.
• We have develop a robust platform Atomizer [45] to analyze the heap of a process
running inside a virtual machine in a Cloud environment.
• We developed a library to analyze pages that have been swapped out of the main
memory in a VM.
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• In our collaboration we developed ModChecker [32] which is a unique and light weight
method to verify the integrity of the kernel modules by cross viewing similar virtual
machines in a Cloud environment.
• In our collaboration we developed IDTChecker [33] which verify the integrity of im-
portant kernel structure like Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) to detect the presence
of a malware entity.
• Several peer-reviewed research publications have resulted from this collaboration.
1.5 Organization
The organization of the rest of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 describes various publica-
tions and works done related to our ﬁeld of heap-based malware analysis. After discussing
some past works we are going to discuss our major work in heap-based malware analysis in
the Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides conclusions and some directions for future work.
1.6 Bibliographic Attributions
This thesis presents the work that was part of the following publication.
• Atomizer: A Fast, Scalable and Lightweight Heap Analyzer for Virtual Machines in
a Cloud Environment, which was presented at the proceedings of 6th Layered Assur-
ance Workshop (LAW'12), In conjunction with the 28th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference(ACSAC'12) on December 2012 at Orlando, Florida
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter we will describe, in detail, various works done in the ﬁeld of heap-based
malware analysis. Various techniques have been used in many work of literature toward
studying and mitigating the eﬀects of the heap based malwares. We will provide a brief
introduction of these works in this part of the dissertation. There has been a large volume of
work published on heap spray detection. Most of the work focuses on JavaScript analysis and
classifying web contents on the basis of dynamic and static features. This chapter covers the
existing approaches and tools that are most related to our work. Section 2.1 describe various
works in the ﬁeld of heap-based malware detection and analysis. Section 2.2, Section 2.3
and Section 2.4 describes some major works done by Microsoft [18] in the ﬁeld of heap-based
malware detection and analysis.
2.1 Miscellaneous Work
In this section we are discussing some minor works that are related to heap-based mlaware
analysis.
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2.1.1 Heap Inspector
LeMasters [51] demonstrates a simple Heap Inspector tool that visualizes heap sprayed
NOP sleds by searching for byte patterns that resemble NOP instructions. It does so by
injecting a DLL into the process that is being analyzed to create a gateway to the heap
object. It further relies on the Windows API to gather the heap data. All this combined
not only signiﬁcantly impacts the performance of the guest system, but also is detectable by
malware.
2.1.2 JSAND
Cova et al. propose JSAND [37] that provides a framework to emulate JavaScript code and
discover the key features that are most commonly found in malware. These features include
code obfuscation, environment analysis techniques, and exploitation mechanisms. JSAND
uses machine-learning techniques to establish the characteristics of normal JavaScript code
and uses these characteristics to detect anomalous code [37]. JSAND is a ﬁnger printing tech-
nique that can be evaded by a clever malware developer. Techniques like time-based checks
and exception handling described in [43] can be used to evade the emulation part of JSAND.
Unlike Atomizer, JSAND relies heavily on emulation which can have many limitations [43].
2.1.3 BuBBles
An important property of a heap-spraying attack is that it relies on homogeneity of memory.
This means that it expects large parts of memory to contain the same information (i.e., its
nop-shellcode). It also relies on the fact that landing anywhere in the nop sled will cause
the shellcode to be executed. BuBBle's [40] countermeasure breaks that assumption by
introducing diversity on the heap, which makes it much harder to perform a heap-spraying
attack. The assumption is broken by inserting special interrupting values in strings at random
positions when the string is stored in memory and removing them when the string is used
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by the application. These special interrupting values will cause the program to generate an
exception when it is executed as an instruction. Because these special values interrupt the
strings inside the memory of the application, the attacker can no longer depend on the nop
sled or even the shellcode being intact. If these values were placed at ﬁxed locations, the
attacker could attempt to bypass the code by inserting jumps over speciﬁc possible locations
within the code. Such an attack however is unlikely, because the attacker does not know
exactly where inside the shellcode control has been transferred. However, to make the attack
even harder, the special interrupting values are placed at random locations inside the string.
Since an attacker does not know at which locations in the string the special interrupting
values are stored he cannot jump over them in his nop-shellcode. This lightweight approach
thus makes heap-spraying attacks signiﬁcantly harder at very low cost.
2.2 Nozzle
Working for Microsoft, Ratanaworabhan et al. proposed Nozzle [60] which performs static
control ﬂow analysis of parts of the heap, interpreting them as code segments to detect ma-
licious content. Nozzle accomplishes that by intercepting common heap allocating function
calls and gathering information about the heap, as well as its content. This technique is
browser-speciﬁc and could potentially be detected by the attacker. As described by Nozzle,
an attacker could time her heap sprays to avoid detection by this mechanism. Scanning heap
objects via introspection requires no memory hooks and makes the entire guest operating
system oblivious to heap analysis. Nozzle also poses a 10% overhead, which led to the de-
velopment of an improved version of the programs called Zozzle [38]. The basic architecture
of Nozzle is shown in ﬁgure 2.1.
Nozzle is a run time monitoring infrastructure that detects attempts by attackers to
spray the heap. Nozzle uses lightweight emulation techniques to detect the presence of
objects that contain executable code. To reduce false positives, Nozzle uses a notion of
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Figure 2.1: Basic Nozzle Architecture
global "heap health". Its lightweight emulator scans heap allocated object data to identify
valid x86 code sequences, disassembling the code and building a control ﬂow graph. Because
the attack jump target cannot be precisely controlled, the emulator follows control ﬂow to
identify basic blocks that are likely to be reached through jumps from multiple oﬀsets into the
object. Nozzle developed a novel approach to mitigate this problem using global heap health
metrics, which eﬀectively distinguishes benign allocation behavior from malicious attacks.
Fortunately, an inherent property of heap spraying attacks is the fact such attacks aﬀect
the heap globally. Consequently, Nozzle exploits this property to drastically reduce the false
positive rate. Nozzle was mostly static method of detecting heap spray attacks. It visited
various URLs and tried to detect presence of heap spray based attacks n those URLs. The
heavy weight nature of Nozzle made it diﬃcult to be deployed in a running environment.
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2.3 Zozzle
Zozzle [38] was the next iteration after Nozzle in the work being done by Microsoft with
regards to heap spray attacks. Zozzle is a low-overhead solution for detecting and prevent-
ing JavaScript malware that is fast enough to be deployed in the browser. Its approach
uses Bayesian classiﬁcation of hierarchical features of the JavaScript abstract syntax tree
to identify syntax elements that are highly predictive of malware. Zozzle is able to detect
JavaScript malware through mostly static code analysis eﬀectively. Zozzle has an extremely
low false positive rate of 0.0003, which is less than one in quarter million. Despite this high
accuracy, the Zozzle classiﬁer is very fast, with a throughput at over 1 MB of JavaScript
code per second [38].
Zozzle is designed to perform static analysis of JavaScript code on a given site and quickly
determine whether the code is malicious and includes an exploit. In order to be eﬀective,
the tool must be trained to recognize the elements that are common to malicious JavaScript,
and the researchers behind it stress that it works best on de-obfuscated code. The Zozzle
was trained by crawling millions of Web sites and using Nozzle, to process the URLs and see
whether malware was present.
Zozzle is speciﬁcally designed to detect and defend against heap-spraying exploits
launched by malicious JavaScript found on Web sites. In many cases these days, that kind
of exploit is hosted on a legitimate site that's been compromised and is being used as part
of a drive-by download attack. Often, the code is hosted on a speciﬁc page for a day or
even a few hours and then is taken down, either by the attacker or the site owner. it's been
shown in [38] this, along with the multiple layers of obfuscation that attacker use to cloak
JavaScript exploits, can make it diﬃcult for automated tools to identify such malware with
a high degree of accuracy.
Once Nozzle has labeled JavaScript contexts, it needs to extract features from them that
are predictive of malicious or benign intent. For Zozzle, Nozzle creates features based on the
hierarchical structure of the JavaScript abstract syntax tree (AST). Speciﬁcally, a feature
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consists of two parts: a context in which it appears (such as a loop, conditional, try/catch
block, etc.) and the text (or some substring) of the AST node. For a given JavaScript
context, it only track whether a feature appears or not, and not the number of occurrences.
To eﬃciently extract features from the AST, it traverses the tree from the root, pushing
AST contexts onto a stack as it descends and popping them as it ascends. These features
are then used in Zozzle to identify suspicious activity.
Zoozle was created to remove the main drawback in the Nozzle, that was it's heavy
weight nature. Although Zozzle was faster than Nozzle but it still lack various feature [49]
that allowed various malware to pass by it.
2.4 Rozzle
In recent years, attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in browsers and their associated plugins
have increased signiﬁcantly. These attacks are often written in JavaScript and literally
millions of URLs contain such malicious content.
While static and runtime methods for malware detection been proposed in the litera-
ture [60] [38] [40], both on the client side, for just-in-time in-browser detection, as well as
oine, crawler-based malware discovery, these approaches encounter the same fundamen-
tal limitation. Web-based malware tends to be environment-speciﬁc, targeting a particular
browser, often attacking speciﬁc versions of installed plugins. This targeting occurs because
the malware exploits vulnerabilities in speciﬁc plugins and fail otherwise. As a result, a
fundamental limitation for detecting a piece of malware is that malware is triggered infre-
quently, only showing itself when the right environment is present. In fact, we observe that
using current ﬁngerprinting techniques, just about any piece of existing malware may be
made virtually undetectable with the current generation of malware scanners.
Rozzle [49] is a JavaScript multi-execution virtual machine, a way to explore multiple
execution paths within a single execution so that environment-speciﬁc malware will reveal
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itself. Using large-scale experiments, it is shown that Rozzle increases the detection rate for
oine runtime detection by almost seven times. In addition, Rozzle triples the eﬀectiveness
of online runtime detection. It is also shown that Rozzle incurs virtually no runtime overhead
and allows to replace multiple VMs running diﬀerent browser conﬁgurations with a single
Rozzle-enabled browser, reducing the hardware requirements, network bandwidth, and power
consumption.
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Chapter 3
Heap-base Malware Detection
In this chapter we are going to discuss in detail our major contribution. We developed a
robust tool to detect heap-based malwares using introspection in virtualized environment
like Clouds. Section 3.1 discusses the Atomizer [45] which is a novel technique developed to
detect malicious activities in the heap of a process.
3.1 Introduction to Atomizer
Atomizer which browses through the heaps of processes running inside VMs and looks for
heap-based activities like heap spray. Atomizer runs on a privileged VM and uses VMI to
access the heaps of the processes inside virtual machines running on a cloud server. Currently,
only the heaps that are allocated by the operating system for the processes can be accessed
by Atomizer. Application-generated heaps (e.g., those created by the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM)) can also be examined by Atomizer, through available Atomizer APIs. Atomizer
requires no changes to be made to virtual machine manager(VMM), VMs and the programs
being monitored.
Atomizer's architecture makes it diﬃcult for any malware inside the VM to detect and
disable it. Atomizer also monitors all the pages of the heap that have been swapped out
of main memory. Atomizer is designed to be modular, so that new features can easily be
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added. The most popular type of heap-based attacks are heap sprays [60], that's why in this
chapter we are mainly focused on heap spray attacks, although Atomizer can also be used
for detecting any heap-based attacks.
Heap Spraying techniques involve instructing client side languages such as JavaScript to
allocate large blocks of heap memory (50-200MB) containing malicious shellcode and NOP
sleds that "slide" into the shellcode. The ﬁnal piece of the puzzle relies on overwriting a
function pointer to point to a random location within the large NOP sled heap object [2],
which typically requires a separate exploit. Large blocks of heap spray can easily be detected
by simple scans, however, newer and less intrusive heap spray attacks that more accurately
manipulate the layout of the application heap layout increase reliability and precision, with-
out the need for large blocks of heap spray. Techniques like Feng Shui Heap Spray [68]
defragments and makes holes in the heap object to insure that the function pointer is readily
available and positioned properly for smashing with a heap overﬂow [39].
Techniques like JIT spraying [35] have been developed to bypass both ASLR and DEP.
JIT spraying utilizes knowledge about a JIT compiler's architecture to spray the heap with
executable code that can then be compiled by the JIT compiler. The JIT heap spray is
constructed large enough to overwhelm and bypass ASLR. JIT spray uses return oriented
programming (ROP) [61] gadgets to mark the heap pages as executable so that the contents
of the pages can be executed. JIT spray uses a leaked pointer, which is essentially a random
heap address, to jump to that location and follows the NOP sled down to the JIT shell code
that is executed to exploit the system. Modern exploitation techniques, such JIT spraying,
makes it even more important to look for malicious activities inside the heap of a process.
3.2 Atomizer Architecture
The Atomizer infrastructure consists mainly of three components, Process Information Ex-
tractor, Heap Extractor and Swapped Heap Page Extractor as shown in Figure 3.1. We
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assume a typical cloud computing environment consisting of hardware, a VMM (or hyper-
visor such as XEN [31]), guest VMs and a privileged VM (where Atomizer gains access the
heap memory content using VM introspection). The reason behind the development of a
real time out-of-VM heap spray analyzer as a proof of concept that ooading heap spray
detection to the hypervisor has insigniﬁcant impact on the guest OS.
The ﬁrst component, Process Information Extractor, is responsible for determining the
basic attributes of the process being monitored. These basic attributes of the process include
the internal operating system structures that provide us with valuable information about the
location of the process in physical memory. The location of the heap is extracted in the second
step called Heap Finder. There might be various heaps in the process and the location of all
of them are passed on to the next component, Heap Extractor.
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The Heap Extractor component receives the physical memory locations of the heaps from
the ﬁrst component of the Atomizer and extracts all the heap pages of the process. In a
typical system some heap pages may be swapped out of physical memory for eﬃciency, so the
Atomizer architecture also has the capability to access pages that are currently swapped out.
When the Heap Extractor module encounters a swapped heap page, it uses the Swapped
Heap Page Module to access those pages. The Swapped Heap Page Extractor component of
the Atomizer uses information about the guest OS' swapping architecture to access swapped
pages.
The Atomizer is designed to work in a cloud environment to monitor multiple VMs run-
ning in the environment using a single privileged system. The VMI interface provides access
to the memory of all the VMs running on a single physical server. The Atomizer can browse
through the heaps of all the processes running in these VMs with low performance impact,
i.e., without using many of resources of the cloud server. The Atomizer has a modular design
which allows adding support for various operating systems. The Heap Analysis Module part
is also designed in such a way that adding additional modules to enhance heap analysis is
very straightforward. In particular, the Heap Extractor module provides an application pro-
grammable interface (API), allowing new heap analysis techniques to use the Heap Extractor
API's to access heap memory. These API's can be used to detect any type of heap-based
attacks.
3.3 Atomizer Implementation
We developed a proof of concept prototype of Atomizer on XEN [31] that had Microsoft
Windows XP (Service Pack 2) VMs running. We used the libVMI library [17] to introspect
the heap of web browsers (Internet Explorer or Firefox) running on Windows XP virtual
machines. We also used libguestfs [16] to access the page ﬁle of memory pages that have
been swapped to the hard drive.
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3.3.1 Process Information Extraction
Windows operating systems maintain information about executing processes in Process En-
vironment Block (PEB) structures. In this part of the implementation, Atomizer looks for
memory address of the PEB structure of the process. It goes through known memory ad-
dresses to locate the PEB structure using appropriate PEB signatures [62]. Once the location
of the PEB structure is found the information regarding the process is extracted from it.
That information includes the location of the heaps, number of heaps available and maxi-
mum number of heaps allowed by the OS. This information is then forwarded to the next
component of the Atomizer.
Algorithm 1 Heap Memory Browsing using VAD tree
for i = 0x7FFD0000 to 0x7FFDF000 do
if ((5 == i+ 0xa4)&&(1 == i+ 0xa8)) then
PEB = i
break;
end if
end for
HEAPNUM := PEB + 0x88
HEAPADDRESS := PEB + 0x090
heapCounter := 0
while heapCounter < HEAPNUM do
HEAPNODE := HEAPADDRESS +(4 ∗ heapCounter)
segmentCounter := 0
while segmentCounter < 64 do
HEAPSEGMENT := HEAPNODE + 0x58 + (4 ∗ segmentCounter)
HEAPENTRY := HEAPSEGMENT + 0x20
while (HEAPENTRY + 0x005) 6= 0 do
HEAPSIZE := HEAPENTRY
READ_MEMORY(HEAPENTRY, HEAPSIZE)
HEAPENTRY := HEAPENTRY + (HEAPSIZE * 8)
end while
segmentCounter++
end while
heapCounter++
end while
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3.3.2 Heap Extractor
The Heap Extractor component of Atomizer provides the main facility for browsing through
the heap of the process using the virtual address descriptors (VAD) obtained via introspec-
tion. The memory manager in Windows maintains a set of VADs that describes the status of
the process's address space [62]. To ﬁnd the VAD tree of a process being monitored, it uses
the process environment block structure (PEB) information received from Process Informa-
tion Extractor. Using this information, it browse through all the heap nodes, heap segments,
and heap entries in various heaps of a process. Algorithm 1 describes the algorithm used to
browse through the entire heap. If a heap page entry is in the VAD tree and not in physical
memory, than there is a possibility that the heap page has been swapped out of memory.
As modern heap sprays do not require large amounts of NOP sleds, it is important that
those heap pages are also examined. Details of how it access pages that are swapped out are
provided in Section 3.3.3. Heap extractor can access the page memory both page by page
and byte by byte. This facility has been provided to facilitate various algorithms that might
perform better with either of these memory access methods. This implementation uses the
page by page access method to extract one page at a time from the heap and send it to the
Heap Analysis Module (discussed in Section 3.3.4).
3.3.3 Swapped Heap Page Extractor
When the Atomizer needs to access a swapped out page, it follows a procedure similar to
that of the guest OS. We can describe this method as a two-step process where in the ﬁrst
step, the Atomizer retrieves the page ﬁle number and the page oﬀset and in the second step,
it uses this information to obtain the value of the virtual address from the page ﬁle.
Atomizer prototype is based on Windows XP (SP2), with Physical Address Extension
(PAE) support enabled, for implementation. The PAE gives us four levels of virtual address
translation where a (32-bit) virtual address (in PAE) contains the pointers to the page
directory pointer table, page directory table, page table and page byte oﬀset. Unlike the
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Algorithm 2 Simple NOP Sled Detection
NOPZ ← HASH-TABLE of NOPs/NOP-replacements
LIMIT ← 150
BUFFER ← Memory buﬀer from Heap size = SIZE
SKIP ← 1
index := 0
nops := 0
skipped := 0
while index < SIZE do
if NOPZ[ BUFFER[index++] ] then
nops++
else if skipped < SKIP then
skipped++
else
nops := 0
end if
if nops == LIMIT then
NOP sled detected
end if
end while
page directory pointer table, the page directory and page table both have 64 bit entries.
PAE supports two page sizes i.e. 4K and 2M (also referred as large page). Depending on the
page size (4K and 2M), the page ﬁle number and page oﬀset are recorded into the page table
or the page directory respectively. If the 7th bit of page directory entry is valid, it means
that the entry is pointing to a large 2M page instead of a page table. In order to ensure
that an entry in the page directory or page table contains the oﬀset of a page in page ﬁle, its
0th (valid bit), 10th (prototype bit) and 11th (transition bit) bits must be zero. Moreover,
the oﬀset is present in the higher 32 bits (from 32 to 51 bits) of the 64-bit entry and the
page number is present in the lower 32-bit of the entry. In the second step, Atomizer uses
the libguestfs [16] library to access the page ﬁle of the guest VMs from Dom0 and reads
the corresponding page using the page oﬀset information. Atomizer then uses the page byte
oﬀset present in the virtual address to access the value of the virtual address. The page byte
oﬀset is the oﬀset of the value in the page pointed to by the virtual address.
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3.3.4 Heap Analysis Module
The heap memory received from the heap extractor can be analyzed in the Heap Analysis
Module. Various algorithms may be used here to determine whether the heap of the process
contains malicious contents or not. Some techniques like STRIDE [34] and ECL-Polynop [42]
use sequential analysis of network packets to detect NOP sleds in network traﬃc, rather than
in the process heap itself. Using the same model in this implementation, I implemented a
simple Polymorphic NOP detection algorithm to detect the presence of NOP sleds in the
heap using sequential analysis of the heap data. This implementation uses the Atomizer
architecture to sequentially go through the heap memory and compares each byte of data
with a hash table of NOPs and NOP replacements. The algorithm keeps tracks of sequences
of NOPs/NOP replacements found and if the length of these sequences are beyond a certain
limit it raises a ﬂag. The sequence limit used in our experiments was 150 NOPs. This
limit was selected because it gave no false positives in our experiments. This simple NOP
sled detection algorithm is depicted in the Algorithm 2. This module demonstrates that
Atomizer architecture provides a simple way of implementing these kinds of algorithms in
the heap analysis module to detect NOP sleds. The presence of NOP sleds typically means
that malicious content is present in the heap.
3.4 Atomizer Evaluation
3.4.1 Experimental Settings
For this experiment, we build a simple cloud environment. This test bed featured a Quad
Core i7 (2.67 GHz * 8) server with HyperThreading enabled and 18 GB of RAM. This server
had a 64-bit privileged virtual machine (DomO) running Fedora 16 (kernel 3.3.2-6) along with
Xen 4.1.2 [31]. We instantiated ﬁve VM clones (DomU: Dom1-Dom5) in Xen from a single 32
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bit Window XP (SP2) installation to make sure that all VMs are identical. We also used
the introspection library for VMI (libvmi-0.6) [17] and libguestfs [16] in all the experiments.
3.4.2 Malware Detection
To test the eﬀectiveness of Atomizer was tested against various types of heap sprays com-
monly found on the web, as well as some custom made heap spray programs.
Simple Heap Spray
The ﬁrst set of experiments involved the Skypher heap spray generator [9], an example of a
simple heap spraying technique. Diﬀerent variants of Skypher were tested on both Internet
Explorer and Mozilla Firefox. Atomizer eﬀectively detected the heap spray with no false
positives. Atomizer was also tested against another known heap spray attack, Aurora [8].
This types of heap spray demonstrated some simple obfuscation techniques to hide the
payload. The payload in Aurora was encrypted using the JavaScript libraries and decrypted
at run time. The Atomizer detected the heap spray without any false positives.
Polymorphic NOP Sled Detection
To test the eﬀectiveness of Atomizer against polymorphic NOP sled detection, in the second
set of experiments, we created a small application in C that sprayed various polymorphic
NOP sleds along with a dummy shell code in the heap. Most of the NOP sled obfuscation
tools like ADMutate [1] are designed to evade Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS) by encrypt-
ing the packets which contain the heap spray code until it is executed. As we are monitoring
the heap, the NOP sled cannot be encrypted in the heap making it the best place for detect-
ing it. Polymorphic NOP sleds use NOPs and NOP replacements to simulate the behavior of
random data in the heap. This implementation uses a hash table of up to 118 known NOP
replacements (which includes both one and two bytes NOP replacements) to detect the NOP
sleds. This hash table represents the most commonly used NOP replacements used by roots
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kits like ADMutate [1], which contains the biggest public list of NOP replacements [42].
NOP sleds that might include unknown NOP replacements may not be detected by this im-
plementation but newly discovered NOP replacements may potentially be added seamlessly
to our hash table. This implementation successfully detected the polymorphic NOP sleds
without any false positives.
Heap Feng Sui
The Atomizer was tested against a state of the art exploit, Heap Feng Shui [68]. Heap Feng
Shui is a deterministic heap spray that reduces the amount of heap spraying required for
the exploit. Heap Feng Shui uses the HeapLib (a JavaScript heap manipulation library) to
defragment the heap so that it can align the heap nodes and consequently requires a smaller
size of heap spray to execute the exploit. The Atomizer was able to detect this exploit which
shows its eﬀectiveness against state of the art exploits.
3.4.3 Experimental Performance Analysis
An experimental performance analysis of the Atomizer with respect to CPU resource utiliza-
tion was done to determine the eﬀect of heap spray detection on the cloud environment. The
main purpose of these experiments was to determine the CPU resources used by Atomizer.
For performance evaluation purposes in these experiments, the Atomizer was allowed to con-
tinue scanning the heap even after the heap spray block was found. For better performance
the detector should be stopped when the ﬁrst sign of malicious activity is raised.
In these experiments, the Atomizer was run on VMs with a simple workload (like a web
browser running a YouTube video). This workload also represents the application being
monitored by Atomizer during the experiment. The CPU usage was monitored while the
systems ran. This was done to set a baseline that shows CPU usage in the normal usage of
the VMs. Figure3.2(a) shows the CPU baseline for the VMs.
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The Atomizer was run as a multi-process application to monitor all the virtual machines
running on the server. The current multi-process implementation of Atomizer works around
a lack of thread safety in the libVMI library, an issue that we are currently working to
address. The Figure 3.2(b) shows the eﬀect of Atomizer on the CPU. The Figure 3.2 shows
the cumulative CPU usage of all the Virtual CPU's (VCPU) on the server (in this case there
were eight VCPUs). This shows the overall eﬀect of all the applications, including Atomizer
and VMs on the CPU usage. Xentop [31] (the tool used in this experiment to measure the
CPU usage) adds up the percentage of all the VCPUs available to the system. The rise in
the CPU usage is due to the processing needed by the light load running on the VMs plus the
eﬀect of Atomizer. The multi-process nature of the Atomizer also exerts more load on CPU.
This limitation can be removed by implementing a multi-threaded version of Atomizer, a
project that we have currently underway. The average CPU load increased incrementally,
that shows that Atomizer has acceptable performance and is scalable.
3.4.4 Conclusion
Atomizer presented a novel and scalable method to analyze the heap memory of the processes
running inside a set of VMs, via VM introspection. Atomizer can be easily extended by
implementing new detection methods for any type of heap-based attacks. Experimental
results show that Atomizer successfully detects various heap spray attacks and randomly
generated polymorphic NOP sled samples with no false positives. Further work is required
to improve the performance via a multi-threaded implementation of Atomizer.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In this thesis we have discussed various tools developed by us that can enhance our ability to
detect and analyze various heap-based malware and kernel level exploits. Our tools provide
robust ways of detecting the malwares in Cloud based environment. This ability to detect
malware at a cloud level is unique to our tools and distinguishes them from all other tools out
there. The reason behind this assumption is that they are specially designed to work in an
environment where multitudes of VMs are running at the same time. The similarity between
the VMs created by the notion that it is simple to deploy similar VM at the same time give
us a unique opportunity to observe the changes that can be created by malware entity in that
environment. We use this opportunity to investigate these changes using our tools. These
changes can be sometimes quite striking like a nop-sled in the heap or can be subtle like a
small change in the heap like Heap Fang Shui [68]. These changes can be diﬃcult to ﬁnd
because they are cleverly crafted to be hidden from the naked eye by hiding them behind
the regular working of the Operating System or the Application they are targeting. Our
tool Atomizer [45]is designed speciﬁcally to look through the regular working environment
of the heap of process or kernel memory space (that also includes kernel heap) to look for
signs of these malware using introspection. The regular working working environment of
any system can be really chaotic and our tools are designed to look for certain aspect of
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the malwares that are only speciﬁc to them. The large scale deployment of our tools is
also a unique feature. As they are designed to monitor a Cloud environment they can be
used to observe large number of VMs at the same time without putting unnecessary load
on the Cloud Servers and with out making huge changes to the code. This provides a great
feature for our tools to be deployed quite easily in an environment like Clouds, which was
designed to use the physical power of the machines to the maximum by deploying large
number of VMs at the same time. This also provided us with certain challenges that are not
available in the non-virtualized environment. We had to look at the memory of the VMs as
a whole and use various signatures to ﬁgure out where diﬀerent applications were located
(running in the memory) and then look for the heap and other memory area and structures
in those applications. Inside the VMs this thing can bee done using system libraries directly
which is considered as their weakness because the malware can detect the presence of these
monitoring tools and possibly disable them, which is not possible in our scenario. This also
give us more control over the analysis, that was not available inside the VMs.
Atomizer provides us with the capability to look through the heap of any type of process
running inside the virtual machines. This is like a library which can be used to create tools,
which are trying to detect malicious activity inside the heap. The dynamic nature of the heap
is quite challenging for any tools to detect and analyze the heap directly. Most tools rely on
indirect methods for the detection of heap-based malware. This can reduce the reliability
of these tools to certain extant and makes it possible for malwares to detect the presence
of a detection mechanism. Atomizer not only analyzes the whole heap but also checks for
malicious activity in the heap pages that have been swapped out of the main memory. These
features are unique to our tool and keep the false positive to the minimum.
This work provides us with various important tools. During this research, we discovered
newer arenas that we could not cover in this work and are left as future work. The most
important thing that we observed was that, there were various applications that were using
custom heap managing libraries on top of OS provided heap mangers. These custom heap
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managing libraries are being used to either provide more control over heap management
(for performance purposes) or to provide extra security on the heap. One study on Adobe
PDF Reader custom heap manager [52] suggests that custom heap management in these
application can open new doors for malware developers to take advantage of weakness in
them. More study is required to detect malicious activities in custom heap managers and
heaps created by them.
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